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ABSTRACT: This paper aims to clarify certain features of the systematicity arguments by a review of 
some of the largely underexamined background in Chomsky’s and Fodor’s early work on transformatio-
nal grammar.
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RESUMEN: Este artículo intenta clarificar ciertos aspectos de los argumentos de la sistematicidad revisando 
parte del trasfondo en gran medida infraexaminado en el trabajo temprano de Chomsky y de Fodor sobre gra-
mática transformacional.
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I must admit that I have only two intellectual heroes. One was Jerry Fodor; the other is 
Noam Chomsky. Despite my deep respect for Fodor and his work, I had only the brief-
est of interactions with him, limited to a few comments and questions at conferences and 
workshops. For more personal insights, I rely on others. On this score, Georges Rey tells 
the following story that is both amusing and, I think, illuminating:
I once asked him, “Jerry, you probably know more scientific psychology than any other phi-
losopher: why, when you give an example of a psychological law, do you take a trivial folk ex-
ample, such as Eating potato chips can make you want to eat more, instead of any serious ones 
from actual psychology?” Without hesitation, he replied, “Citing the science would be vulgar”. 
(Rey, 2018, p. 335)1
I cannot vouch for Fodor knowing more scientific psychology than any other philosopher, 
but Fodor’s habit was very much in evidence when he explained that human cognition is 
systematic by claiming, “no native speaker comes to understand the form of words ‘John 
loves Mary’ except as he also comes to understand the form of words ‘Mary loves John’.” 
(Fodor, 1987, p. 150).
I note Fodor’s stylistic idiosyncrasy because it is one, among many, reasons that can 
make the systematicity arguments difficult to follow and evaluate. Indeed, some have sug-
gested that such simple, or simplistic, formulations as Fodor, and others following him, in-
voke are not scientific.2 Others have observed that Fodor does not document the existence 
of systematicity through references to the scientific literature, so that the systematicity of 
thought is a myth or a hoax.3
This paper will try to compensate a bit for Fodor’s idiosyncrasy by reviewing some 
of his and Chomsky’s work in linguistics in the 1960s. This history will (I hope) provide 
a new angle on the systematicity arguments. It will, first and foremost, draw attention to 
part of the basis Fodor had for thinking that thought has systematic features. Second, it 
will help focus attention on a key feature of the systematicity arguments, namely, a role for 
some notion of what is ad hoc. Third, and finally, it will provide a reason to be skeptical 
of the hypothesis that the systematicity of thought derives from the systematicity of lan-
guage.4
Section 1 will review the systematicity arguments highlighting three important con-
cepts, namely, productivity, systematicity, and the idea of the ad hoc. Section 2 will review 
the discussion of the productivity of natural language in Fodor (1961), Katz et al. (1963), 
and Chomsky (1964). This review helps us see how Fodor adapted his early thinking about 
the productivity of natural language into a case for the existence of systematic features of 
thought and a compositional explanation of them that is not ad hoc. Section 3 will draw 
attention to Chomsky’s idea that good explanations in linguistics require more than that 
a grammar generate all and only the sentences of a language. There are, in addition, consid-
erations of what is simpler and not ad hoc. Such considerations underlie the sense that the 
1 This is not the only amusing or insightful bit of Rey’s discussion of Fodor, but it is the one that best 
suits my present purposes.
2 See Travieso et al. (2014, p. 377).
3 See Chemero (2014, pp. 355-9).
4 See Gomila et al. (2012); Travieso et al. (2014).
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systematicity arguments are instances of inference to the best explanation wherein what 
makes for a better explanation is a kind of simplicity and avoidance of the ad hoc. Section 
4 will try to show how the considerations developed in sections 2 continue to be theoreti-
cally and empirically relevant, as they speak to recent attempts to explain the systematicity 
of thought by appeal to the systematicity of language.
1. Productivity, Systematicity, and the Ad Hoc
The productivity of a natural language, such as English, refers to the hypothesis that there 
is no finite bound on the length of a sentence. This unbounded character might be sug-
gested by sequences such as the following
John loves Mary
It’s not the case that John loves Mary
It’s not the case that it’s not the case that John loves Mary
It’s not the case that it’s not the case that it’s not the case that John loves Mary.
This is the house that Jack built
This is the malt that lay in the house that Jack built
This is the rat that ate the malt that lay in the house that Jack built.
This is the cat that killed the rat that ate the malt that lay in the house that Jack built.
By a natural idealization, one has it that natural languages are productive.5 There is no 
point where, say, adding another negation converts a grammatical sentence of English into 
an ungrammatical sentence. One gets the idea that thought is productive, if one is granted 
the assumption that speakers of a natural language can entertain the thoughts expressed in 
their natural language.6
Fodor (1987) and Fodor et al. (1988) propose, for the sake of argument, not to rely on 
the idealization to the infinite representational capacities invoked in the productivity argu-
ment. Instead, they suppose that there are only finitely many possible occurrent thoughts.7 
Consider, then, in Fodorian style, a simplified set of possible occurrent thoughts.
(1) John loves John
 John loves Mary
 Mary loves John
 Mary loves Mary.
5 Chomsky (1956, p. 15), Chomsky (1957, pp. 23-4) proposes that it is simplicity in the grammar that 
motivates the view that natural languages are productive.
6 Cf. Fodor et al. (1988, p. 39); Fodor (1987, p. 151) where the systematicity of thought is inferred from 
the systematicity of natural language along with the assumption that understanding a sentence of one’s 
natural language is a matter of thinking the thought the sentence expresses. 
7 The discussion that follows will assume only that it is occurrent thoughts—thoughts that “come to 
mind” so to speak—that are systematic. The reason is that dispositional thoughts might be stored in 
another format that is used to construct occurrent thoughts. McLaughlin (2009, p. 254) however, pro-
poses that systematicity extends to all thoughts.
Kenneth Aizawa
32 Theoria, 2020, 35/1, 29-43
Let these be all and only the thoughts that might occur to some cognitive agent. Fodor and 
Pylyshyn claim that such a set has two features. First, some of the thoughts are “intrinsically 
connected.” Second, some of the thoughts are semantically related.8 For the sake of simplic-
ity, I believe, Fodor and Pylyshyn focus on pairs of thoughts, such as John loves Mary and 
Mary loves John. We might understand the “intrinsic connection” between them as one of 
counterfactual dependence. The agent would not have the capacity to think that John loves 
Mary unless she had the capacity to think that Mary loves John, and vice versa.9 To say that 
thoughts are semantically related is to say, to a first approximation, that they are about the 
same individuals in the same relation.
I take it that interests of simplicity are behind the focus on such pairs. First of all, the 
point is not about pairs per se. All the members of the following cluster of thoughts are pu-
tatively counterfactually dependent and semantically related:
(2) John introduced Mary to Bob
 John introduced Bob to Mary
 Mary introduced John to Bob
 Mary introduced Bob to John
 Bob introduced John to Mary
 Bob introduced Mary to John10
Second, consider the intrinsic connections among the thoughts in (1). The thought that 
John loves Mary and the thought that John loves John are (presumably) not mutually 
counterfactually dependent, since one might have the capacity to have the thought that 
John loves John, without having the capacity to have the thought that John loves Mary. 
One might not have the concept of Mary. Third, consider semantic relatedness. The 
thought that John loves Mary and that John loves John does not have the same individu-
als in the same relations. The first thought is about Mary, where the second is not. So, even 
though Fodor evidently presupposes that the set of possible occurrent thoughts is some-
thing like (1), he does not try to provide a characterization of the “intrinsic connections” 
and semantic relations among all the thoughts in the set.
Note that sometimes Fodor, Pylyshyn, and McLaughlin propose something somewhat 
stronger than we have set out above.11 They propose, roughly, that one does not find cog-
nitive agents who can think that thought that aRb, unless they can think the thought that 
8 Fodor et al. (1988) describe the first feature as “the systematicity of cognitive representations,” (sec-
tion 3.2) and the second as “the compositionality of representations.” (section 3.3).
9 McLaughlin (2014, p. 33), Ramsey (2014, p. 255) accept this way of understanding systematicity. 
McLaughlin (2009) also treats these in terms of “systematicity laws”. Fleshing out the idea of “intrinsic 
connection” in terms of counterfactual dependence may help dispel the sense that the explanandum 
presupposes that the thoughts have the same components, thus begging a question in favor of a syntac-
tically and semantically compositional language of thought. (Cf. Matthews (1994, p. 355) regarding 
question begging. See McLaughlin (2009, p. 257f) for a reply.)
10 McLaughlin notes “The idea that thought abilities come in clusters can be captured by saying that they 
come in pairs” (McLaughlin, 2009, p. 253). I read him as saying that you can get the point of coun-
terfactual dependence by looking to pairs; not that one must explicate counterfactual dependence by 
looking to pairs.
11 Cf, e.g., Fodor et al. (1988, pp. 40, 44); Fodor et al. (1990, p. 202); McLaughlin (2009, p. 254).
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bRa. This is a stronger claim than what we have set out above insofar as it implicitly assumes 
that the schematic letters “a” and “b” can take on any individuals and “R” any relations as in-
stances. This stronger claim has, of course, invited various putative counterexamples.12 It has 
also invited questions about just how pervasive these intrinsic connections are supposed to 
be.13 Fodor and Pylyshyn, however, are aware of the “patchiness,” we might call it, of the in-
trinsic connections and semantic relations: “It’s uncertain exactly how compositional natu-
ral languages actually are (just as it’s uncertain exactly how systematic they are)” (ibid. p. 42.) 
Fodor elsewhere suggests that a precise characterization is unnecessary. “Just a little system-
aticity of thought will do to make things hard for Aunty, since, as previously remarked, [ri-
val conceptions] are compatible with there being no systematicity of thought at all” (Fodor, 
1987, p. 153.) Fodor’s point, in this last, reinforces what I take to be his intent in focusing 
on pairs of thought capacities in order to run his argument. The upshot, perhaps, is that the 
challenge of the systematicity arguments is not so much to explain why thought is system-
atic, but to explain why thought is as systematic as it is. In more detail, the challenge is not so 
much to explain why there are intrinsic connections/semantic relations between thoughts, 
but to explain why there are as many intrinsic connections/semantics relations between 
thoughts as there are. Why, one might ask critics, is this not a perfectly good challenge?
Fodor and Pylyshyn propose that cognitive representations have a combinatorial syn-
tax and semantics. Cognitive representations constitute a language of thought. Oversimpli-
fying, the meanings of some cognitive representations (i.e. molecular representations) are 
determined by the meanings of atomic representations and the way in which those atomic 
representations are put together. So, we might have {John, loves, Mary} as our syntactic at-
oms with the obvious meanings and a single cognitive-grammatical construct. Fodor and 
Pylyshyn implicitly presuppose that this syntactically and semantically combinatorial lan-
guage of thought bests all comers as an account of the structure of cognitive representa-
tion, so that, for purposes of illuminating how the systematicity arguments work, we might 
consider a very simple rival hypothesis, namely, that all cognitive representations have an 
atomic semantic and syntactic structure.14 Let the atomic symbols be {◆, ♥, ♣, ♠} with the 
meanings John loves John, John loves Mary, Mary loves John, and Mary loves Mary. Fol-
lowing (Fodor, 1987), let us call this very simple hypothesis “Intentional Realism.”
Consider the language of thought explanation of the intrinsic connections among pos-
sible occurrent thoughts. According to the language of thought story, if our hypothetical 
cognitive agent were to lose the capacity to think that John loves Mary, this could be be-
cause the agent lost the concept of John, or of loves, or of Mary, or the grammatical con-
struction that forms the thought that John loves Mary. But, if the agent were to lose one 
of those things, then the agent would thereby lose the capacity to form the thought that 
Mary loves John. Similarly, if the agent were to have the capacity for the thought that John 
loves Mary, then the agent must have the concept of John, the concept of loves, the con-
cept of Mary, and the grammatical construct that forms the thought that John loves Mary. 
But, a cognitive agent that has all that would thereby have the capacity to form the thought 
12 Cf, e.g., Matthews (1997, p. 162), Johnson (2004), Travieso et al. (2014, p. 378). For a defense of this 
stronger claim about systematicity, see McLaughlin (2009).
13 See Chemero (2014).
14 Ramsey (2014, p. 258) concurs that Fodor and Pylyshyn mean to take on all rivals.
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that Mary loves John. Here we have a straightforward explanation of the counterfactual 
dependence between the thoughts. What, however, would be the Intentional Realist ac-
count? Why would losing the symbol ♥, meaning John loves Mary, have any implications 
for losing the symbol ♣, meaning Mary loves John? There is no account.
Consider the language of thought explanation of the semantic relatedness of possible 
occurrent thoughts. In theory, one could have an agent whose possible occurrent thoughts 
are {John loves Mary, bears sleep in the woods, Einstein was a physicist}. But, one does not 
find such agents. Why? Because the stock of possible occurrent thoughts is built up out of 
a stock of syntactic and semantic atoms that form a set of semantically related thoughts. 
What, however, would be the Intentional realist account? Why would the stock of symbols 
be semantically related, rather than not?
Notice that Fodor and Pylyshyn, on the one hand, devote one section of their paper 
to the intrinsic connections among thoughts and another to the semantic relatedness of 
thoughts. This suggests that they are supposed to be separate explananda. On the other 
hand, they claim that, “Compositionality is closely related to systematicity; perhaps they're 
best viewed as aspects of a single phenomenon.” Then, later, they expand upon this,
We now add that which sentences are systematically related is not arbitrary from a seman-
tic point of view. For example, being able to understand 'John loves the girl' goes along with be-
ing able to understand 'the girl loves John', and there are correspondingly close semantic relations 
between these sentences: in order for the first to be true, John must bear to the girl the very same 
relation that the truth of the second requires the girl to bear to John. By contrast, there is no in-
trinsic connection between understanding either of the John/girl sentences and understand-
ing semantically unrelated formulas like 'quarks are made of gluons' or 'the cat is on the mat' or 
'2 + 2 = 4'; it looks as though semantical relatedness and systematicity keep quite close company. 
(Fodor et al., 1988, pp. 41-2; cf., Fodor et al., 1990, p. 202)
This later passage obviously suggests an intimate connection between the two explananda. 
Here is an interpretation of what is going on. Fodor and Pylyshyn seem to have in mind 
three distinct psychological features to be explained. First, there are intrinsic connections 
between some possible occurrent thoughts. Second, there are semantic relations among 
some possible occurrent thoughts. And, third, the possible occurrent thoughts that are in-
trinsically connected are also semantically related. John loves Mary and Mary loves John 
are intrinsically connected and semantically related. Why? There is no conceptual or logi-
cal connection between intrinsic connectedness and semantic relatedness. In principle, one 
could have a cognitive agent in which there are thoughts that are intrinsically connected, 
but not semantically related. Such a cognitive agent might be such that its capacity to think 
that John loves Mary and its capacity to think that the cat is on the mat are intrinsically 
connected, but they are clearly not semantically related in the relevant sense. Moreover, in 
principle one could have a cognitive agent in which there are thoughts that are semantically 
related, but which are not intrinsically connected. Such an agent might have the capaci-
ties to think that John loves Mary and Mary loves John, but is such that neither thought is 
counterfactually dependent on the other. But, given that intrinsic connectedness and se-
mantic relatedness do go hand in hand, a cognitive scientist should have an explanation of 
this. But, the language of thought story given in the last paragraph gives an answer to this. 
The language of thought explanation of the intrinsic connection between thoughts yields 
an explanation of their semantic relatedness “for free” one might say. Once one has in place 
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the language of thought account of the intrinsic connections between possible occurrent 
thoughts, one needs no additional hypotheses to explain the semantic relatedness of pos-
sible occurrent thoughts. There is a simple, non-ad hoc account of why intrinsically con-
nected thoughts are semantically related. This is what seems to underlie the sense in which 
the language of thought hypothesis is supposed to be the best explanation of the systematic 
features of thought.15
This pass through the systematicity arguments has no references to any background 
linguistics literature on systematicity. But, even a casual reader of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s 
discussion will notice the references to Chomskyan ideas in generative linguistics. In what 
remains of this paper, I will try to provide what seem to be some of the salient features of 
this background in order to elaborate on some of the finer points of the systematicity ar-
guments. I do not mean to claim that Fodor borrows the systematicity arguments from 
Chomsky or from theories of transformational grammar. Instead, Fodor draws on some of 
the implicit ideas in linguistics to develop the systematicity arguments.
2. Why Believe Language and Thought have Systematic Features?
While some have suggested that the intrinsic connections and semantic relations among 
thoughts is a myth, I propose to flesh out Fodor’s claim that the principal ideas of the sys-
tematic arguments may be found in the earlier discussions of the productivity of natural 
language. Consider Chomsky’s following contention:
The central fact to which any significant linguistic theory must address itself is this: a mature 
speaker can produce a new sentence of his language on the appropriate occasion, and other speak-
ers can understand it immediately, though it is equally new to them. Most of our linguistic experi-
ence, both as speakers and hearers, is with new sentences. (Chomsky, 1964, p. 50)
Notice that this contention does not presuppose that language is productive. It could be 
that speakers/hearers are able to cope with novel sentences, because there are infinitely 
many of them. Or, it could be because there is a large, but finite number of them. Notice 
what Chomsky’s “central fact” implies. Given experience with a finite sample of sentences 
from a natural language, speakers develop the capacity to produce/understand many—per-
haps infinitely many—novel sentences. Given experience with a sample of English sen-
tences, children will “extrapolate” from their sample to many, many new sentences. Thus, 
there appears to be a counterfactual dependence between the production/understanding of 
some sentences and the production/understanding of others.
There is little doubt that Fodor was aware of this putative “central fact,” as C homsky’s 
paper appeared in the (Fodor et al., 1964) anthology. Moreover, Katz et al. (1963) (reprinted 
in the anthology along with Chomsky’s paper) expand on Chomsky’s point in the following:
A fluent speaker’s mastery of his language exhibits itself in his ability to produce and un-
derstand the sentences of his language, INCLUDING INDEFINITELY MANY THAT ARE 
WHOLLY NOVEL TO HIM … The emphasis upon novel sentences is important. The most 
15 Cf., Fodor (1987, p. 149); Aizawa (1997, p. 117); Aizawa (2003, Chapter 2).
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characteristic feature of language is its ability to make available an infinity of sentences from 
which the speaker can select appropriate and novel ones to use as the need arises. That is to say, 
what qualifies one as a fluent speaker is not the ability to imitate previously heard sentences but 
rather the ability to produce and understand sentences never before encountered. The striking 
fact about the use of language is the absence of repetition—almost every sentence uttered is ut-
tered to the first time. This can be substantiated by checking texts for the number of times a sen-
tence is repeated. It is exceedingly unlikely that even a single repetition of a sentence of reasonable 
length will be encountered. … Since a fluent speaker is able to use and understand any sentence 
drawn from the infinite set of sentences of his language, and since, at any given time, he has only 
encountered a finite set of sentences, it follows that the speaker’s knowledge of his language takes 
the form of rules which project the finite set of sentences he has fortuitously encountered to the 
infinite set of sentences of the language. (Katz et al., 1964, pp. 481-2)
Here Katz and Fodor embraced what was the going conclusion of the day, namely, that the 
set of sentences of a natural language is infinite, but, as noted above, that is an inessential 
feature of the argument for a compositional basis to natural language. The principal point 
is that language acquisition involves taking a finite set of sentences, and then extrapolating 
to a larger set.
But, what are these extrapolations like? Again, simplifying in Fodorian fashion, we 
might have at one time the set of producible/understandable sentences
(3) “John loves John”
 “John loves Mary”
 “Mary loves John”
 “Mary loves Mary”.
But, then, the agent learns the word “likes,” from “John likes Mary,” so that the set of pro-
ducible/understandable sentences becomes
(4) “John loves John” “John likes John”
 “John loves Mary” “John likes Mary”
 “Mary loves John” “Mary likes John”
 “Mary loves Mary”. “Mary likes Mary”
But, then, at a later stage, the agent learns, say, the passive grammatical construction, so 
that the set of producible/understandable sentences is
(5) “John loves John” “John likes John”
 “John loves Mary” “John likes Mary”
 “Mary loves John” “Mary likes John”
 “Mary loves Mary”. “Mary likes Mary”
 “John is loved by John” “John is liked by John”
 “John is loved by Mary” “John is liked by Mary”
 “Mary is loved by John” “Mary is liked by John”
 “Mary is loved by Mary” “Mary is like by Mary.”
At each stage, there will be pairs of sentences that are intrinsically connected and semanti-
cally related. So, in (5), there will be
“John loves Mary” and “Mary loves John,”
“John likes Mary” and “Mary likes John,”
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“John is loved by Mary” and “Mary is loved by John”, and
“John is liked by Mary” and “Mary is liked by John”16
Notice that that there are two types of counterfactual dependencies in play here. One is 
diachronic; the other synchronic. So, there is a diachronic dependence between an agent’s 
encounter with the sentence, say, “John likes Mary” at time t0 and the possession of all the 
“like sentences” in (4) at a later time t1. The agent would not have all the members in the 
set (4) at t1 if the agent had not encountered “John likes Mary” at t0. The intrinsic connec-
tion of interest in the systematicity arguments, however, is synchronic. The idea is that the 
agent would not have the capacity to produce/understand the sentence “John loves Mary” 
at time t0 if the agent did not have the capacity to produce/understand the sentence “Mary 
loves John” at time t0, and vice versa.17
But, what mechanism enables this pattern of extrapolation? Katz and Fodor propose 
that, “This problem requires for its solution a rule which projects the infinite set of sen-
tences in a way which mirrors the way speakers understand novel sentences. In encounter-
ing a novel sentence, the speaker is not encountering novel elements but only a novel com-
bination of familiar elements.” (Katz et al., 1963, p. 171). The elements here are the words 
or morphemes of the language and the grammatical structures underlying them. So, one 
can see in this argument that there will be counterfactual dependencies and semantic rela-
tions among some of the pairs of sentences a speaker can understand. Indeed, one can see 
that, on this account, the sentences that are counterfactually dependent are also semanti-
cally related.
At the risk of belaboring Fodor’s familiarity with this argument, we might note the fol-
lowing from one of Fodor’s earliest papers:
Nevertheless, it seems that some aspects of the ability to understand and produce novel sen-
tences may be characterized in terms of our present knowledge about the systematic relations of 
sentences in natural languages. To give one example: it is clearly a necessary condition for under-
standing a new sentence that one should be implicitly capable of giving a grammatical analysis of 
the sentence. This involves at least the ability to decide correctly upon those substitutions for var-
ious components of the sentence which preserve grammaticality. The set of such substitutions, 
however, partially determines the relation between the sentence in question and other sentences 
in the language. Thus, understanding
1. The boy went to the store
involves knowing such facts as that
2. The girl went to the store
is a grammatical sentence in English while
3. The gives went to the store
is not. (Fodor 1961, 73)
16 Travieso et al. (2014) note that “John loves Mary” and “Mary is loved by John” are not counterfactu-
ally dependent, since speakers typically acquire the former years before the latter. That is, of course, 
right, but misinterprets which pairs Fodor supposed to be both semantically related and counterfactu-
ally dependent.
17 NB. The diachronic counterfactual dependence is asymmetric, where the synchronic counterfactual 
dependence is symmetric.
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It is striking that Fodor uses the word “systematic” to describe these relations. This use 
seems to hark back to Fodor’s talk of “intrinsic connections” between thoughts as in (1) 
above, but not the idea of counterfactual dependence between thoughts as found in this, 
and many other passages like it:
What does it mean to say that thought is systematic? Well, just as you don’t find people 
who can understand the sentence ‘John loves the girl’ but not the sentence ‘the girl loves John,’ 
so too you don’t find people who can think the thought that John loves the girl but can’t think 
the thought that the girl loves John. Indeed, in the case of verbal organisms the systematicity of 
thought follows from the systematicity of language if you assume-as most psychologists do-that 
understanding a sentence involves entertaining the thought that it expresses; on that assumption, 
nobody could understand both the sentences about John and the girl unless he were able to think 
both the thoughts about John and the girl. (Fodor et al., 1988, p. 39; cf., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988, 
pp. 41-2, quoted above)
It might have been helpful had Fodor and Pylyshyn provided a reference to Fodor (1961), 
Katz et al. (1963), or Chomsky (1964). Nevertheless, if one were to take Fodor and 
P ylyshyn at their word that there were productivity arguments for a combinatorial syntax 
and semantic in natural language, one could track them down.
It is probably worthwhile to note three points where the ideas and arguments of 
Chomsky’s and Fodor’s early writings differ from what appears in the systematicity argu-
ments. First, and most obviously, the early arguments were concerned with the produc-
tivity of natural language, hence the combinatorial syntax and semantics of natural lan-
guage, whereas the later arguments are concerned with the productivity and systematicity 
of thought. Second, in the early arguments, Fodor and Chomsky relied on the novelty of 
sentences encountered. As noted above, sentences could generally be novel whether there 
were finitely or infinitely many of them. And this would seem to form a perfectly sound ba-
sis for a systematicity argument. Yet, it is probably only a manifestation of Fodor’s idiosyn-
cratic style to push the envelope so as not to rely on the novelty of encountered sentences 
at all. Instead, he could make do with homely examples, such as “John loves the girl” and 
“The girl loves John,” and that anyone who understands the sentence “John loves the girl,” 
will ipso facto extrapolate to an understanding of “The girl loves John.” Third, in the pas-
sage from Fodor (1961) cited above, Fodor took the ability to give a grammatical analysis 
of a sentence to be constitutive of the ability to understand that sentence. Roughly speak-
ing, if you cannot assign a parse tree to a sentence, you do not understand that sentence. So, 
a tourist who can produce a sound string does not thereby have a fluent speaker’s under-
standing of a corresponding sentence.18 One need not embrace this, however, in order to 
appreciate the force of the systematicity arguments.
3. Inference to the Best Explanation in Generative Linguistics
Turn now to another bit of the background to Fodor’s presuppositions in the systematicity 
arguments. Chomsky’s “Three models for the description of language” (Chomsky, 1956), 
18 Cf., Fodor, 1987, p. 149.
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and Syntactic Structures (Chomsky, 1957), are among the seminal contributions to the 
cognitive revolution. In his introduction to the second edition, in 2002, for example, Da-
vid Lightfoot described Syntactic Structures as “the snowball which began the avalanche of 
the modern ‘cognitive revolution’” (Lightfoot, 2002, v). These works were surely well un-
derstood by Fodor. They were, for example, part of the background to Katz et al. (1963). 
Moreover, Fodor (1961) cites Syntactic Structures as part of the theoretical backdrop to his 
paper.
Although Chomsky allows that a language may either be finite or infinite, he main-
tains that human natural languages are unbounded. The human mind being finite, how-
ever, there must be finite means for generating and understanding each of the sentences of 
the language. The first model Chomsky examines for the description of natural languages 
is that they are given by so-called “finite state models.” (Cf., Chomsky, 1956, section 2; 
Chomsky, 1957, chapter 3.) Chomsky argues against the adequacy of such models on the 
grounds that they do not generate many of a wide range of types of sentences found in Eng-
lish. To borrow some later terminology, Chomsky would say that finite state grammars are 
observationally inadequate (Cf., Chomsky, 1964, p. 53).
In the initial formulation of the argument against finite state models, Chomsky pre-
supposes that there is no finite bound on the length of a sentence, in other words, that 
English is productive. Later, he entertains the hypothesis that there is a finite bound on 
the length of an English sentence. So, at some point, one would find that, say, “Carl and 
Fred and Larry and Tom ate the cheese” is an English sentence, but “Carl and Fred and 
Larry and Tom and Ken ate the cheese” is not. Such a move is comparable to Fodor’s set-
ting aside the productivity of thought in favor of considerations of intrinsic connectedness 
and semantic relatedness. Of the possibility of a finite bound on sentence length, Chomsky 
writes,
Such arbitrary limitations serve no useful purpose, however. If these processes have no fi-
nite limit, we can prove the literal inapplicability of the [finite state] theory. If the processes have 
a limit, then the construction of a finite state grammar will not be literally out of the question, 
since it will be possible to list the sentences, and a list is essentially a trivial finite state grammar. 
But this grammar will be so complex that it will be of little use or interest.
If there is no finite limit on the length of sentences—if it is admitted that natural lan-
guage is productive, then the model of language is “literally inapplicable” per the argu-
ment above. It is observationally inadequate. If, however, there is a finite bound on sen-
tence length, then the grammar would be of the sort postulated by the Intentional Realist 
in section 1 above, namely, the well-formed strings of the language are just {◆, ♥, ♣, ♠, …}. 
Such a grammar, used for a genuinely significant fraction of English “would serve no useful 
purpose” and “will be so complex as to be of little use or interest.” Chomsky, thus, thinks 
that there is more to having a good grammar—a good system of representation—over and 
above mere generative capacity. There is more to having a good account of a system of rep-
resentation than merely providing for observational adequacy. A better account is one that 
is, in some sense, simpler.
Finite state grammars were only the first of three models Chomsky considered. In ad-
dition, there are phrase structure grammars and transformational grammars. Chomsky 
prefaces his case for transformational grammars over simpler phrase structure grammars 
with the following:
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The strongest possible proof of the inadequacy of a linguistic theory is to show that it literally 
cannot apply to some natural language. A weaker, but perfectly sufficient demonstration of inad-
equacy would be to show that the theory can apply only clumsily; that is, to show that any gram-
mar that can be constructed in terms of this theory will be extremely complex, ad hoc, and ‘unre-
vealing’. (Chomsky, 1957, p. 34)
So, there are (at least) two grounds upon which a representational system can be faulted. 
First, it might be faulted for not being able to represent all that needs to be represented. 
This was the problem facing “grammars” that are mere lists. One might say that such a 
grammar does not provide an explanation of why certain strings are members of a language. 
Second, a representational can be faulted for being ad hoc or for being excessively complex. 
This was the problem facing phrase structure grammars versus transformational grammars. 
And, we might understand an ad hoc complex explanation to be worse than a non-ad hoc 
simple explanation. An ad hoc complex explanation is not one we would infer through an 
inference to the best explanation.
Return now to the way in which Fodor is implicitly relying, not on observational ade-
quacy, but on some standard of better explanation. Recall the claim that
No doubt it is possible … to wire a network so that it supports a vector that represents aRb if 
and only if it supports a vector that represents bRa; … The trouble is that, although the architec-
ture permits this, it equally permits Smolensky to wire a network so that it supports a vector that 
represents aRb if and only if it supports a vector that represents zSq. (Fodor et al., 1990, p. 202)19
The idea is that one might get a system that can represent both aRb and bRa, hence be ob-
servationally adequate and have thoughts that are semantically related. And, one might 
also have it be the case that these representations are counterfactually dependent. But, in 
addition, one wants some explanation of why it is that the thoughts that are semantically 
related are also counterfactually dependent. Why do these two features of thought go to-
gether? On the language of thought hypothesis, the claim is that once one has on board 
what is needed in order to explain the counterfactual dependencies in thought, one has 
on board what one needs in order to explain the semantic relatedness of possible thoughts 
(and vice versa). One needs no “extra assumptions”. The language of thought explanation 
is, in that sense, simpler. It is not, in that sense, ad hoc.20
4. The “Central Fact” about Language is Still Worthy of Attention
Consider, now, how Chomsky’s “central fact” about language might bear on more recent 
attempts to deal with the systematicity arguments. Gomila et al. (2012, pp. 102-3) and 
Travieso et al. (2014, pp. 373-4) propose that the systematicity challenge is to provide a ge-
netic explanation of why thought is systematic and that the correct explanation is that the 
systematicity of thought is induced by the systematicity of natural language. In more de-
19 Cf., Fodor et al., 1988, p. 50; Fodor et al., 1990, p. 202; Ramsey, 2014, pp. 255-6.
20 Aizawa, 1997, 2003, try to provide examples from the history of science that illustrate the kind of reli-
ance on ad hoc hypotheses that are implicitly taken to make for inferior explanations.
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tail, they seem to think that thoughts get their contents from language, so that the patterns 
among the contents of possible thoughts arise from the patterns among contents of sen-
tences in the agent’s natural language.21 So, an agent comes to have the set of possible oc-
current thoughts {John loves John, John loves Mary, Mary loves John, Mary loves Mary} 
because the agent has, say, the set of possible English sentences {“John loves John,” “John 
loves Mary,” “Mary loves John,” “Mary loves Mary”}. In other words, they propose to ex-
plain the content relatedness of possible occurrent thoughts in terms of the content relat-
edness of possible sentences of a natural language.
Grant them this for a moment. This still leaves the counterfactual dependence among 
thought unexplained. Why is it that there is a counterfactual dependence between the John 
loves Mary thought and the Mary loves John thought? Travieso, Gomila, and Lobo provide 
no account. Nor do they provide an account of the co-occurrence of counterfactual de-
pendence and semantic relatedness.
Now take back what was granted in the last paragraph. Of course, Gomila, Travieso, 
and Lobo can claim that the capacity to extrapolate from “John loves Mary” to “Mary loves 
John” in English also induces the capacity to extrapolate from the thought that John loves 
Mary to the thought that Mary loves John in “mentalese.” But, that claim can’t be all there 
is to the story. Why, as things stand, is this not a mere ad hoc stipulation? Why does the lin-
guistic extrapolation enable the comparable extrapolation in thought? Why, for example, 
doesn’t the linguistic extrapolation outstrip the extrapolation in thought? Suppose that 
English has a compositional syntax and semantics, but that thought does not. Why, then, 
is it not the case that agents have the capacity to parse the sentence “John loves Mary” and 
therefrom extrapolate to a parse tree for “Mary loves John,” but still not understand (think 
the thought) that Mary loves John. To put the matter another way, in the case of English, 
one would have a combinatorial explosion in the number of possible sentences as the lexi-
con increases in size, but why, in the case of thought, would there be a similar combinato-
rial explosion, unless there were in fact combinations to explode in number? Again, if only 
language has a combinatorial syntax and semantics, then it would seem that the representa-
tional resources of language would easily outstrip the representational resources of thought. 
By contrast, according to the language of thought account, the explosive growth in both 
language and thought is possible because of the combinatorics of both. But, if thought has a 
combinatorial syntax and semantics, then thought would have a language of thought.
Another way of putting the concern here is that Gomila et al. seem not to have come 
to grips with the apparent implications of what Chomsky and Fodor took to be the “cen-
tral fact” of natural language. Why is it that, upon exposure to a finite number of sentences, 
a speaker is able to produce and understand (perhaps non-denumerably) many novel sen-
tences? The Fodorian/Chomskyan answer is that natural language has a combinatorial 
syntax and semantics. But, if a speaker can understand all of these sentences of her natural 
language, then how it is that thought is able to “keep up” with language, if not with a syn-
tactically and semantically combinatorial language of thought?
21 They actually claim only an “isomorphy” between the sentences of natural language and of thoughts, 
but I assume they want synonymy. “John loves Mary” is isomorphic with “Mary loves John”, and “Bob 
likes Alice”, but is synonymous only with the first. They would seem to mean synonymy, since a set of 
semantically related sentences of a natural language could be isomorphic with a set of semantically un-
related sentence of mentalese.
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5. Conclusion
My principal aim in this paper was to look at the systematicity arguments through the lens 
of some of Chomsky’s and Fodor’s early work in linguistics. This background is frequently 
mentioned in Fodor’s writings on systematicity and productivity, but has not been given 
the kind of detailed references to the literature that would help a newcomer to the topic 
easily track this down. Nor has this background been reviewed to bring out its relevance. 
Nevertheless, it can provide us a better understanding of Fodor’s thinking about systema-
ticity, as well as a better understanding of the systematicity arguments for a language of 
thought and certain attempts to reply to those arguments.
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